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1 Jean Cavaillès: a life between mathematics,
philosophy and Resistance
Ambivalent figure of mathematician and philosopher, thanks to his double background and
cross-sectional competences in both fields, Jean Cavaillès (1903-1944) has left a great theore-
tical contribution to the 20th century French epistemology. His works1are extremely complex
and synthetic; maybe for this reason his epistemological work has often been the object of
sketched researches, while bigger attention had been dedicated to his biography, especially to
his Resistance activity in France. Just because of his militancy in the Resistance movement,
Jean Cavaillès was imprisoned and then shot by Nazis, when he was only 41 years old. In the
light of this biographical element, we can understand why his works are scarce.2 Although
he only had few years to work, he however succeeded in leaving an important and original
contribution to the philosophy of mathematics of the last century. We can start sharing the
Canguilhem point of view: Jean Cavaillès has written too little to be summed up and enou-
gh to make us catch the meaning of his philosophical issue.3 We especially think that it is
really interesting to study the epistemological bridge that he was able to build to unify what
were, in his understanding of the knowledge, two banks of the same river: mathematics and
philosophy. To remain in this metaphor, the nature of water that flows into these two banks
emerges when inquiring characteristics of the becoming of science.
2 The historical epistemology
2.1 The historical method
According to Cavaillès, the becoming issue of mathematics must be assessed starting from
the massive methodological and epistemological value of history. The topic of history and a
certain style of “historical epistemology” are an inheritance of his master Brunschvicg. In
his whole production, Cavaillès will keep them as crucial clues, as unavoidable elements and
necessarily coexistent with the occurrence of mathematics. Therefore, only in history we
can find moments of evolution, links, epistemological gaps which characterize mathematical
dialectic, i.e. dialectic as a becoming along a path that is a necessary chain:
Cavaillès bases his researches on historical analysis. He focuses on mathema-
tics becoming, on overtaking processes, thanks to its objects systems enlarge, turn
1The whole Cavaillès’ work, consisting in only 686 pages altogether, is gathered up in (Cavaillès 1994). This text
collects the reprint of Méthode axiomatique et formalisme (1938), the main doctoral thesis, directed by Léon Brun-
schvicg; Philosophie mathématique (1962), wich consists in: the second doctoral thesis Remarques sur la formation
de la théorie abstraite des ensembles (1938), Correspondance Cantor-Dedekind (1937), translated by Jean Cavaillès
and Emmy Noether, and the article Transfini et continu (1947); the posthumous writing Sur la logique et la théorie
de la science (1947); the articles L’école de Vienne au congrès de Prague (1932), Logique mathématique et syllogisme
(1935), Réflexions sur le fondement des mathématiques (1937), La pensée mathématique (1946), Du collectif au pari
(1940), La théorie de la science chez Bolzano (1946), Mathématiques et formalisme (1949) and In memoriam di G.
Canguilhem (Inauguration de l’amphithêatre Jean Cavaillès, 1967; Commémoration à l’ORTF, 1969; Commémora-
tion à la Sorbonne, 1974; Une vie, une Œuvre: 1903-1944, Jean Cavaillès, philosophe et résistant, 1989). There is
only a translation in Italian of Sur la logique et la théorie de la science, edited by V. Morfino and L. M. Scarantino
(2006), Jean Cavaillès, Sulla logica e la teoria della scienza, Milano, Mimesis.
2Concerning the destiny of Cavaillès’ work, the words of Bruno Huisman are emblematic: “When he died at the
beginning of 1944 executed by the Germans, in Arras, Jean Cavaillès left a work that we can’t consider as incomplete;
it is an unfinished work, or better assassinated”. See Présentation in (Cavaillès 1994).
3(Canguilhem 1984, p. 23).
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more abstract and, starting from there, integrate the infinity. Inside the beco-
ming, the overtaking processes prove an outgrowing faculty which belongs to the
thought, a power to create.4
From the Cavaillès’ historiographic reconstruction work, a peculiarity arises: the historical
perspective does not aim at a mere reconstruction of the past, since it would be fruitless in
itself, as dealing with the mathematics becoming. The historical research aims at conside-
ring movement complexity and wholeness starting from the mathematics achievement till a
certain point, in order to observe the present position in that present time, as a starting point
in the future becoming. Furthermore, the historical issue is not focused on the accomplished
path to obtain a certain outcome, but more likely on the achieved goal, which includes, and
at the same time leaves in the background, the whole previous path. The historical analysis
lies in its core consisting of thought in act during the present time:
In a certain way, the homogeneity of materials of the thinking process and the si-
multaneity of mathematics working on its present time are here asserted: empiri-
cism as describing the actual work, but empiricism of the thought in act, referring
only to the unpredictable mathematics becoming.5
In Cavaillès’ point of view, there is a need to take a closer look at mathematics as the actual
work in the actual time, like the actual operation accomplished by “militant” mathematicians
every day.6The act of thinking completely revolves on hic et nunc and, instead of spreading
towards what has been gained before, it suggests the unpredictable mathematics becoming
channelling into the future. The accomplished act in the present is not considered only as
an outcome of the past, but as a foundational moment for a movement forward, as a root for
future work. The defining work exemplifies that channelling into the future:
Defining ways are subjected to variations and demands of its movement: for every
new acquirement, new possibilities rise up. The gaining of nameable concepts
matches with scientific enrichment itself.7
2.2 A history which is not a history
To some extent, Cavaillès’ statement leads to define what he himself attests as “a history that
is not a history”8: the methodological choice of the use of history does not consist in a simple
work of reconstruction of the past and does not confine in an unfruitful backwards look. In
other words, it is not focused on understanding how notions and definitions used at some
point have come out, but it is rather open to future perspectives, possible innovations that
4(Cassou-Noguès 2001, p. 132).
5(Cavaillès 1938c).
6The expression militant mathematician has a very strong meaning in Jean Cavaillès’ works. He uses it at the
end of Méthode axiomatique et formalisme, asserting that the last word on mathematical issues doesn’t belong to the
philosopher, but the militant mathematician. The militant mathematician is, in Cavaillès’ point of view, the person
who has a mathematical education and works with numbers, formulas, theories as well as, with a pencil on his hand,
on symbols, figures, he makes demonstrations advisedly. Furthermore, the adjective militant reminds the military
environment, word that Cavaillès knew well, at first as official in the French army, then as leader of a network of the
Resistance. Being militant for Cavaillès has first of all a moral meaning: it implies the refusal of passivity, taking
the social, political and everyday life in hand. At the same time, it also means to obey a necessity at a theoretical
level. This necessity also correspond to the immanent necessity of the reasoning, to whom the thinking individual
can’t escape.
7(Cavaillès 1938c, pp. 17-18).
8(Cavaillès 1949, p. 664).
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are going to enrich different scientific theories. Historical analysis looks backwards, but it
is completely projected in the forwarding movement of science. This projection in the future
corresponds to a need that comes from the nature of scientific work itself:
If an element of irremovable uncertainty is left [. . . ], its action does not lead back,
the accomplished gesture remains actually valid (final validity of statements), but
it leads forward to transform what is set (modification of the notions).9
Obviously the perspective interest centred on what is coming afterwards does not expect to
be more than a sort of privileged point of you, as the “old” and the “new” ones are connected
in an indissoluble way: the previous moment sustains the subsequent one, and vice versa,
the subsequent moment justifies and explains the former one. As Gilles-Gaston Granger
remarks, the old one subsists as it is only within the new one and, at the same time, necessary
new contents follow the old ones.10 Progress is a continuous generation where the inner
movement produces the rise of new theories starting from the previous ones. On the one
hand, mathematics becoming is characterized by adopting new theories and, on the other
hand, by transforming old theories11: “Mathematics is an odd building whose progressive
construction shifts and reshuffles its foundations”.12 In the history of mathematics, there is
no substitution of a theory with another, but a deepening reflection. Mathematical notions
and theories are not totally rejected, but gradually modified: the mathematical becoming
implies transformation and permanence at the same time. 13
Between the different moments (the old theory, the overcoming of that theory, the new
theory) there is a continuity and it is up to the historian to analyze and reconstruct a poste-
riori the connection between the various stages of mathematical becoming and therefore to
follow the necessary development of mathematical rationality. On the opposite, the role of
the mathematician is different: he works on theories and concepts more innovative than the
ones which are contemporary to him, he does not need to know the past at all, to some extent,
he even “denies that by vocation”.14 Precisely because the history of mathematics is projected
forward, the mathematician’s work consists in leaning towards the future, which implies a
rooting in the past at the same time, but also a denial of antecedent moments:
The history of mathematics appears, among all histories, the less connected to its
vehicle; if there is a connection, it is a parte post and it is only for curiosity, not for
the intelligence of result: what is precedent explains what comes afterwards. The
mathematician does not need to know the past because his vocation is to reject it:
to the extent that he does not submit to what seems to go by itself because it is, to
the extent that he rejects the traditional authority, and disregards the intellectual
climate so as to be a real mathematician, he unfolds necessities. By doing so, what
are the means he uses? The work that denies history takes place in history.15
9(Cavaillès 1938c, p. 187).
10(Granger 1998, pp. 65-77 and p. 70).
11«Double link: with the set and studied problems at that precise moment -choise to rebel-, with yet present
methods, materials to make new instruments. In both cases, either the individual will or the style of an environment
are sufficient explications: even if mathematics is conceived as a system in itself, the winding course of the revealing
process should be related to the structure of the revealed elements». Cfr. (Cavaillès 1938b, p. 226).
12(Cassou-Noguès 2001, p. 135).
13About this, also see Monti Mondella (1962, p. 532): «The recent past of this science [mathematics], he [Cavaillès]
remarks, is not the history of results and contributions, that have been added for mere juxtaposition to the previous
ones, but it is also a critical revision of its own foundations and of the structure of its own theories in a radical sense».
14(Cavaillès 1938b, p. 226).
15(Cavaillès 1938b, pp. 225-226).
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2.3 The mathematician and the epistemologist: the mathematical
development between necessity and contingence
The mathematician has no theoretical interest in reconstructing the historical circumstances
that led to the current situation of mathematics. The history of concepts and theories, in
fact, owes nothing to the contingency, “in spite of the winding process of revelation” 16: the
mathematician is the revealing person of needs, his curiosity and his research are all forward-
becoming, directing his attention to find out what mathematical needs still have to reveal.
The theme of the peculiar role of a mathematician is of great interest to Cavaillès, who
has been talking about it several times during his career. On February 4th, 1939, the So-
ciété Française de Philosophie invited Jean Cavaillès and Albert Lautman (close friend and
colleague17) to present and discuss together the results of their respective doctoral disserta-
tions. From this meeting came the article La pensée mathématique.18 From the very start,
it is obvious that Cavaillès gives particular importance to the division of tasks between the
epistemologist (also historian of mathematics) and the mathematician, because of two cha-
racteristic features of mathematical becoming: on the one hand, it is a process that unfolds
in time, throughout history, through contingencies and accidents; on the other hand, it is
an independent progress, in ceaseless becoming and unpredictability. The epistemologist
and historian of mathematics has to question the path of history, the role of contingencies
and interaction between disciplines in science becoming, the mathematician has to realize
the becoming itself. Although the two elements of historical contingency and mathematical
necessity are inseparable aspects, they are irreducible to each other:
Mathematics is a peculiar becoming. It is impossible to reduce it to nothing but
itself; but also, each definition at a given time, is connected to that very time,
i.e. to the history it is the conclusion of: there is no definition that can be valid
forever. Discussions about mathematics cannot be anything else, but re-doing it.
This becoming seems independent; the epistemologist can realize the necessary
sequencing [enchaînement] under the historical circumstances, concepts are intro-
duced because of the inner needs of a problem solution and, thanks to their being
earlier concepts, they raise new issues.19
Even if it seems paradoxical, there is no contradiction in what we might call the “non-
historical history” of mathematics. After all, Cavaillès stated it clearly: “There is nothing so
little historical – meaning the opaque becoming, perceivable only through artistic intuition
– such as the history of mathematics”.20 The history of mathematics is very little historical
precisely because mathematics is a true becoming: history marks stages and periods, but
mathematics is a living movement, an organic whole,21 which can not be reduced to a perio-
16(Cavaillès 1938b, p. 226).
17The two young philosophers were tied not only by the common interest in the relationship between philosophy
and mathematics, but also by friendship and the shared fight in French Resistance. On the relationship between
Cavaillès and Lautman see (Aglan, Azéma 2002), (AAVV 1985), (AAVV 2003), «La Lettre de la Fondation de la
Résistence», n. 34, (Bloch 2002), (Ferrières 1950), (Granger 2002), (Sinaceur 1987b).
18(Cavaillès 1946a).
19(Cavaillès 1946).
20(Cavaillès 1938c, p. 184).
21About the organic unity of mathematic, see (Cavaillès 1938b, p. 225): These processes are linked in a organic
body: a state of mind constitutes the secret base where the processes are founded with an outward unforeseeability.
We must come back to this unforseeability if we really want to understand, without exposing, but continuing. There
is a deep kinship that links the researchers (without realizing, as a sort of harmony) on the same subject in a precise
moment, vis a tergo, objective impulse of the research itself.
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dization or temporal systematization. Mathematics is a becoming that produces history and
it is produced in history, nevertheless, mathematics and history have different contingent
features that clarify the distance between them. History is mainly the place of contingency,
intended as accidental: the history of mathematics is undoubtedly contingent, but its con-
tingency has nothing to do with randomness. Mathematical becoming is a contingent and
necessary becoming at the same time. Contingent, as it runs through the process of the hi-
story of human thought, but at the same time necessary, due to the nature of mathematics
itself, which finds the reasons of its development within an inner autonomy, indifferent to any
kind of requirement referred to problems external to mathematics becoming. Mathematics
progresses and develops in a way that is intrinsically necessary, according to an independent
movement in the light of which every solution, each discovery and each moment of forward
progress emerges from the single stimulus of an inner need. Due to this inner impetus, the
following moments generated from the problem raised in the required manner and within
this movement, there is nothing accidental meant at random. Mathematics is an authen-
tic rigorous discipline as mathematical methods are not arbitrarily isolated according to the
needs of a particular problem in a given time. On the contrary, it requires a certainty to be
obliged to strip every method used of any “vêtement accidentel”22 of some particular cases
and clarify the necessary and sufficient conditions for its application. Due this extent, the
unpredictability of mathematics is just apparent.23
Although Cavaillès states in a certain way the unpredictability is only apparent, at the
same time, he also thinks the mathematical becoming is authentically, formerly unpredicta-
ble. How to explain this unpredictability’s dual nature, apparent and authentic at the same
time, of the results of the mathematical progress? Precisely because this becoming is a real
becoming, it develops unpredictably: “There is becoming for real: the mathematician is invol-
ved in an endeavour which he cannot stop but arbitrarily, in facts, every moment can bring
a radical innovation”.24 As Houria Sinaceur highlights, at every moment, mathematics deve-
lops bringing out elements that are actually innovative and the necessary element appears
a posteriori, for this reason it is a historical 25 achievement. The necessity of becoming must
not be considered at all as a sort of determinism or teleology: “The development of mathema-
tics is necessary, not because it follows established and predictable paths, or because it obeys
schemes, but as it unfolds through the construction of relations between the results that their
rational connections withdraw, so to say, from contingency”.26
Just because mathematics is unpredictable, but not contingent, it “is subjected to an au-
thentic becoming, which consists in setting new theories and especially in the transformation
of previous theories. Now, the becoming, once recognized, gains primacy over succeeding pe-
riods it connects”.27 Cavaillès goes further, saying that mathematics is not only subjected to
a ceaseless becoming, but it is a movement itself, it is in a peculiar becoming itself.
22(Cavaillès 1938b, p. 225).
23(Cavaillès 1938b, p. 225).
24(Cavaillès 1946a, p. 594).
25(Sinaceur 1994, pp. 31-32).
26(Sinaceur 1994, pp. 31-32).
27(Cassou-Noguès 2001, p. 136).
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3 Characteristics of mathematics
3.1 Mathematics as movement and «enchaînement»
Mathematical becoming is characterized as singular becoming, totally autonomous, unfore-
seeable and historical. Let’s start questioning what it means to define mathematics as a
movement in a never ending and unremitting becoming. When Cavaillès deals with this be-
coming, he talks about a fact inside mathematics, an essential element inscribed into the
mathematical reality itself: “The mathematical becoming has its own objectivity mathema-
tically established”.28 Mathematics is a movement, a never-ending process of redefinition of
problems and elaboration of new theories beginning from the revision of the previous ones,
following a ceaseless chain appearing as an intrinsically and necessary linear progress. On
this continuous path, gap moments could be individuated as epistemological breaks. There-
fore, there are fractures only in appearance, because each moment is essentially connected to
the previous one: “One of the problems of the doctrine of science is precisely that the advan-
cement was not increased in volume by juxtaposition, so that the previous one subsists along
with the new one, but the advancement is an uninterrupted revision of contents through close
examinations and deletions”.29
Therefore the becoming occurs as a continuum in a never-ending becoming, neither as
alternating theories in contrast which develop by denial and opposition between the more
recent and the outdated ones, nor as a simple quantitative increase of knowledge.
In the light of this uninterrupted activity of revision, the history of science outcome lies
in the image of a chain, where any link is indissolubly connected to its previous one forming
a chain extending to infinity through the addition of new links joining the former ones. The
definition of Mathematic as «enchaînement» is the crucial basis of Cavaillès’ thinking. As
Hourya Sinaceur states:
court history, but it is more likely the system that it reveals, i.e. the architecto-
nic set of connections between notions, problems and mathematical methods, the
layered and shifting network coherent with different moments, each of them is
unpredictable, but still indissoluble. History is a necessary practise if we reckon
the whole mathematics and thinking in general is a becoming. Nothing is set nor
is acquired once and for all.30
Rationality develops according to the chain modality, both rationality in general and speci-
fic mathematics rationality. Reasoning evolves as a chain, like a gradual linking of opera-
tions; in other words, reasoning is facing problematic clues set in a necessary order of further
development.
The modality along which reasoning develops mirrors the modality of production and pro-
gress of knowledge, transferring its peculiarities to it. In fact, theories themselves develop
according to this modality, as “the establishment of a certain structure of concepts”.31
3.2 Mathematics as an object sui generis. Bolzano’s heritage
Cavaillès inherits from Bolzano the theme of mathematics as an object sui generis, irreducible
to anything but mathematics itself. In fact, Cavaillès dedicates to Bolzano the last pages of
28(Cavaillès 1938b, p. 226).
29(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 560).
30Sinaceur, Philosophie et histoire in (Aglan & Azéma 2002, pp. 208-209).
31(Cavaillès 1938c, p. 85).
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the first part of his major posthumous work. This part of Sur la logique et la théorie de la
science is a key step, and it was so accurate that it was published under the title La théorie
de la science selon Bolzano in the first issue of «Deucalion» in 1946, edited by Canguilhem
and Ehresmann. Bolzano is an author mentioned several times in Cavaillès’ works, although
during the years Cavaillès dealt with Bolzano, he was still unknown, despite his recognition
by Husserl (to this extent a good example is in the Appendix of Chapter X of the Prolegomena
of Pure Logic). It was Cavaillès who, between the two world wars, recognized the importance
of Bolzano, particularly because he understood the meaning and role of a theory of science as
a theory of the structure of science and of operations included within itself.
What is specifically interesting for Cavaillès in Bolzano’s works is that he makes a critic of
science, i.e. he fathoms what constitutes science as science and what the driving force behind
science is. The main point is that the big merit of Bolzano consists in considering for the first
time science as science, separating himself at first from Kant (who subordinates science to
conscience and defines science starting from conscience), and then from Brunschvicg (who de-
fines science as the starting point between the experience and the world).32 The science, free
from this double subordination, can finally emerge through its autonomy and independence
and it can be defined as itself:
For the first time, perhaps, science is not considered as a mere intermediary bet-
ween the human mind [esprit] and the being in itself, depending on both of them
and without a reality of its own, but it is considered as an object sui generis, getting
an original essence and autonomy through its own movement. 33
Science is a sui generis object, that can not be placed into universe of cultural objects because
they inherently depend on their way to be produced and they are linked to the accidental
exteriority of a sensible system. Furthermore science, unlike cultural objects, does not take
form as a multiplicity of singular realisations: science is one and it demands this unity.
This extract from Cavaillès refers to a dissertation present in Bolzano’s Wissenschaftsleh-
re (1837), namely the distinction, on the one hand, between the sentences in themselves, the
sentences of science, entities that have their own being independently from thought and sta-
tement and, on the other hand, the sentences expressed or thought. Consequently to this
distinction, it follows the independence of science both from consciousness (and the thought
propositions)34 and from the world (and propositions stated)35. This independence and auto-
nomy of science gives unity, which is shaped, first of all, as architecture: there are no different
sciences anymore nor separated moments of a science, but one unique science shaped as uni-
fied, cohesive and organic. This unity of science does not mean that there is unity of principles
or methods, but it means that the various disciplines interpenetrate, are connected, influence
each other and interact, giving rise to science as a system, an architectural structure, a living
organism. This unity implies interdependence between the various parts which partake in a
unified whole. For this reason, “a theory of science can be nothing else than the theory of the
unity of science”.36
The unity of science is characterized as a necessary and indefinite progress37, enclosed in
itself, and its movement and dynamism:
32Cfr. (Cassou-Noguès 2001, p. 265).
33(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 503).
34(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 504).
35Cfr. (Cassou-Noguès 2001, p. 266).
36(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 504).
37Cfr. (Cavaillès 1947b, p. 506).
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This unity is movement: since it does not deal with a scientific ideal, but with con-
crete science, the incompleteness and the need for the progress are a fundamental
part of the definition. Autonomous pure progress, dynamism in itself enclosed,
without absolute beginning nor end, science moves out of the time – if time means
reference to the experience of a consciousness.38
About this characterisation of science, Jean Sebestik defines Cavaillès as the dynamical
side of the static universe of Bolzano,39 which is able to answer to the difficulty consisting
in how to determinate the relationship between science as a whole of out of time truths and
actual science, historically realized. Sebestik precisely underlines that Cavaillès develops his
conception of mathematical becoming, starting and basing it on Bolzano’s theory. In fact, in
this passage of Sur la Logique et la théorie de la science, Cavaillès not only proposes a mere
reading of the science theory of Bolzano, but he also gives an original interpretation, where
sometimes Bolzano’s and Cavaillès’s characterisation of science are mixed up. Furthermore,
it is very difficult to establish, in this extract, which definitions of science are from Cavaillès
or from Bolzano; it is also difficult to understand if some sentences are Cavaillès’s interpre-
tations of Bolzano’s theories or if they are Cavaillès’ original sentences founded on Bolzano’s
epistemology. To give an example: “The true meaning of a theory lies in its unending concep-
tual becoming, not in a particular and essentially provisional aspect”.40 In this sentence it
plainly emerges that expressions as «dynamism», «autonomy», «indefinite progress» of scien-
ce, etc..., are equally appropriate to the science theory of Bolzano as to Cavaillès’ philosophical
conception of the becoming of mathematics.
Anyhow, it is not necessary to distinguish between the thought of these two authors: what
is really important in this excerpt is the praise that Cavaillès shows for Bolzano’s episte-
mology, because he sets science free from the primacy of consciousness and from the world.
Scientific experience consists in including the world in the scientific universe. The value of
science is right in its necessity and so in its capacity to free itself from the empirical world
(that is singularity, exteriority, heterogeneity) to unify science itself. Science organisation is
independent from experience, that is autonomous and that Cavaillès metaphorically defines
as a “Riemann volume, that can at the same time be closed and self-contained”.41 Even if Ca-
vaillès appreciates Bolzano’s epistemology so much, some difficulties arise. The first problem
that emerges is the relationship between theory of science and science itself:
Science doctrine is also a demand of intelligibility and of validity; it is a science
of science, so it is a part of itself. So its statements cannot be essential to a par-
ticular development, but it has to directly appear in the self-illumination of the
scientific movement. Statements differ from the scientific movement because of
their continuous surfacing.42
Cavaillès can not accept a conception which assumes a sort of self illumination, a science
transparency in itself: in this way, Bolzano falls into the same trap as Kant, when he puts
the transparency in itself of the thought into the logic. Bolzano’s theory of science is not a
part of science among other parts, but, in a way, it is the essence of science, the immanent
38(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 504).
39Cfr. (Sebestik 1997).
40(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 505). It is not easy to correctly translate this passage, therefore I quote here the original text:
«Le sens véritable d’une théorie est non pas dans un aspect compris par le savant lui-même comme essentiellement
provisoire, mais dans un devenir conceptuel qui ne peut s’arrêter».
41(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 506).
42(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 506).
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structure of the science chain, it is the structure that knows the chain in an immediate way,
by self illumination. This theory of science on the one hand avoids the subservience, the
dependence on the world, on the consciousness and on a historical being. But, on the other
hand, if the becoming of science consists in a self-revealing process in the construction of the
demonstration, the theory of science has to put down by itself the whole of what it produces.
Finally, in spite of the difficulties in Bolzano’s epistemology, it is necessary to underline
that Cavaillès, in this part of his work, deals with the main issue of his whole work: how
to determinate de relationship between science as a set of out of time truths and historical
science, actually achieved.43
3.3 The refusal of any foundational attempt
3.3.1 Formalism, logicism and intuitionism
In fact, all Cavaillès’ research is specifically focused on the characteristics of mathematical
progress, as an emblematical model of knowledge in general. According to Jean Cavaillès,
mathematics is a singular becoming, irreducible to anything else but the mathematics, that
originates from itself. At the bottom of this characterisation of mathematics there is the
refusal of any foundational attempt, referring to external causes rather than to the dialectical
movement inside mathematics itself.
In his main doctoral thesis, Méthode axiomatique et formalisme. Essai sur le problème du
fondement des mathématiques,44 Jean Cavaillès specifically deals with mathematical foun-
dation’s problem and analyses solutions proposed by formalism, logicism and intuitionism,
coming to the conclusion that none of them can really solve this problem.
First of all, Cavaillès states the failure of the formalism’s foundational project (at least of
what he defines “Von Neumann’s radical formalism”).45 According to Von Neumann, mathe-
matics obtains its objective validity through its representation as a system or a collection of a
system of signs, endowed with a meaning by its rules or structure and of deduction. In other
words, mathematics is considered as a system of signs and rules to be employed, that governs
the mechanical chain of formulas. The formalism’s program consists in founding mathema-
tics on a metamathematics that demonstrates the non-contradiction of formal systems. The
Gödel theorem puts offside the formalist conception of mathematics, because it makes impos-
sible to define mathematics as an hypothetical-deductive system. If it is impossible to bring
a proof of non-contradiction evidence inside the system, the edifice collapses as “the notion of
formal demonstration that gave to the system its only meaning is not yet able to be specified
(because it is not possible to prove that everything is demonstrable in a formal system)”.46
Therefore, Cavaillès takes into consideration logicism foundational attempt. First of all,
he considers “logicism” as it was conceived by the Vienna Circle until 1929 and by Carnap.
Cavaillès thinks that logicism is a sort of formalism’s development and that the formalism’s
failure implies logicism failure too, even if the latter does not base mathematics on systems’
internal non-contradiction, but on logical evidence. Logicism boundary, in Cavaillès’ opinion,
consists in being led by the same hidden realism that in Frege and Russell’s view puts an
“in itself” of the universe.47 According to Cavaillès, logicism, can not solve the mathematical
foundation problem.
43Cfr. (Sebestik 1997, p. 104).
44(Cavaillès 1938c).
45(Cavaillès 1938c, p. 172).
46(Cavaillès 1938c, p. 173).
47Cfr. (Cavaillès 1938c, p. 177).
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Finally, he focuses on the intuitionism, by pointing out the problem that emerges con-
cerning the infinite subject. First of all, it is impossible to explain, by an intuitionist point
of view, how infinite can be introduced in mathematics. Secondly, also in stating infinite in
mathematics, the argument that brings to infinite must be explained and founded.
3.3.2 Psychological or social causality
Besides the fact that the mathematical movement can not be founded on these three ap-
proaches, it takes place in a total independence from any kind of social causality and from
the pressure that the needs of other scientific domains exert. Cavaillès admits that in the
contingent events’ following it could happen that what he named the psychological or social
causality phenomenon can delay or divert the mathematical course. However, despite this
slowing down risk, it is impossible to stop this course, as it has a sort of internal drive in
the direction of progress: The historical, contingent mathematician can stop himself, can be
tired, but a problem’s requirement imposes the act that will solve it’.48 While presenting his
doctoral thesis, his master of thesis, Brunschvicg complains about the fact that he ignored
mathematical psychology, Cavaillès crisply answers that this problem was not what he had
to consider and that he was not interested in this kind of issues.49 What really mattered for
him, were objective cores, relationships of intelligibility: the historical method can bring out
this kind of issues. Cavaillès thinks that it is possible to perceive the internal unity in the
central intuition from which the necessary mathematical chains proceed and we can discover
it, methodically disclose it through the only description phenomena, as it happened in histo-
ry. Therefore, there is a sort of virtuous circle that makes history come out of a theory unity
and it is this unity that gives history its objectivity and justifies its function.
3.4 Mathematics is necessary and unforeseeable. How Cavaillès
explains the paradox
So two fundamental issues of Cavaillès’s thought emerge. On the one hand, he states that we
can not separate the mathematical object from the concrete experience of its elaboration in
the course of time, in a historical moment. In other words, mathematical progress depends
on the operational act of the mathematician, which, at a specific time, elaborates a notion or
defines a new mathematical object. On the other hand, mathematics can only be defined each
time in the present, in the moment when a definition is given: at any time in history, giving a
definition of mathematics that doesn’t strictly concern this time is impossible, when the pre-
sent moment is the achievement of the scientific progress. So mathematics is temporally and
historically characterized and it is definable only in the present time. It can also be constan-
tly re-defined, revisited and it is impossible to know a priori its final result. An everlasting
definition of mathematics does not exist, and it is not possible to determinate what is true
and what is false outside actual mathematics, in its historical context. Mathematicians, as
human being, is irremediably involved in this adventure, he can not foresee its progress, ma-
thematics is carried out by the scientific movement, in the time when every moment acquires
its radical innovation.50
That is the way mathematics can, at the same time, be necessary but not predetermined:
a becoming, in order to be an authentic becoming, has to be unforeseeable. Cavaillès underli-
48(Cavaillès 1946a, p. 627).
49Letter of 28th April 1938, in (Ferrière 1950).
50Cfr. (Cavaillès 1946a, p. 594).
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nes that this unforeseeability is not placed in the intuition of the “militant” mathematician.
In fact, when he works, he obviously knows (or better, he can imagine) in what direction it
is necessary to carry out his search: his operational act is not casual. Unforeseeability is
instead placed in an original level, it is based on the foundation of mathematics: “It is what
can be called the basic dialectics of mathematics: if new notions seem to be needed by given
problems, this novelty itself is really an absolute novelty”.51 It seems that both necessity and
unforeseeability are a paradox in their development, but we can explain this by characte-
rising mathematical progress as an achievement through an experimental method, and not
as the development of a logical demonstration.52 The unforeseeability of mathematics can
be really considered an absolute novelty if the peculiar way of the becoming of mathematics
is considered as an operation that mathematicians do in an experimental context, working
towards a discovery. Unforeseeability is not set into theories, as if it was a sort of unfore-
seeability of the mathematical operations: unforeseeability of the becoming of mathematics
shows itself when a theory is overcome by dialectical movements. Unforeseeability is origi-
nal, fundamental, placed at the heart of the becoming53 and because of it, science gains its
meaning: “The real meaning of a theory is not in what the scientist considers as a temporary
step, but it is in an unstoppable conceptual becoming”.54
4 Dialectics of becoming of science
The last issue that must be taken into account belongs to the determination of the dialectics
of the becoming of science. “A doctrine of science could be provided not by a philosophy of
science, but by a philosophy of the concept. The generating necessity is not that of an ac-
tivity, but of dialectics”55: these words conclude Jean Cavaillès’ Sur la logique et la théorie
de la science, that could be considered as his philosophical will. Cavaillès did not have the
time to deepen the philosophical meaning of the dialectics of concept, that he endorsed as a
model for the elaboration of a correct theory of science, in opposition to the philosophies of
knowledge. However, it is possible to reconstruct the gist of the dialectics of concept without
misinterpreting Cavaillès’ thought since the author left, scattered in his texts, various ele-
ments that can be detected and made coherent and systematic. Cavaillès’ theory of science,
being a philosophy of concept, is interpreted by most part of critics as a program rather than
a thorough theory, as a need rather than as a doctrine.56 Yet, the dialectics of concept is to
be considered the gist of Cavaillès’ philosophy of science, by means of which it is possible to
tie together all its different aspects and, in particular, the history and the nature of the be-
coming of knowledge. Consequently, it is possible to elucidate the peculiar use of the notion
of dialectics held by Cavaillès. In spite of its rare use, this notion has a deeper and more
original meaning than it might appear at fist glance.57 This is the interpretation given by
Henri Mougin, who claims that:
51(Cavaillès 1946a, p. 601).
52“This means that is impossible to find new notions into the demonstration, just analising already utilised notions:
for example, [analizing] generalisations which have generated new processes” (Cavaillès 1946a, p. 601).
53(Sinaceur 1994, p. 33).
54(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 505).
55(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 560).
56For instance, this view is endorsed by Schwartz (1998, p. 82); in (Sinaceur 1985, pp. 977-978): «Reading again the
last lines of Cavaillès’ «philosophical will», for the reader these lines are similar to an oasis, because they propose a
program at least»; finally, in (Cassou-Noguès 2011, p. 312): «In my opinion, the last part of the text of the posthumous
work it’s quite a sketch, the outline of his plan and it’s not really a task that is over».
57Cfr. (Dubarle 1948b, p. 359).
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The results of Cavaillès’ reflection are all oriented towards the elaboration of this
notion of dialectics [. . . ]; the dialectics hides itself behind failures and requires, at
every step, a positive and authentic effort towards a new experience. If I should
sum up in a word the whole philosophical reflection of Cavaillès – after the remem-
brance of the friendly controversies [between Cavaillès and myself] –, I would say
it essentially consists in a dialogue with the notion of dialectics, a dialogue that
was already developed between 1933 and 1937, years during which the reflections
on dialectics became fundamental; a dialogue that became even more intense after
1937.58
Cavaillès had already made use of the term ‘dialectics’ in his doctoral thesis both as a sub-
stantive and as an adjective referring to progress, movement and to the chain of concepts:
“internal dialectics of the intuitive activity”, “the dialectics of the history of mathematics”,
“the dialectic development of mathematics”59, “dialectic generation of concepts” (referring to
Cantor’s works), “dialectic movement that generates the∞”60, “dialectic passage from a theo-
ry to a superior one”, “dialectic development of the mathematical experience”, “the creative
dialectics”, “the dialectic necessity”61 “dialectic concatenation of concepts”, “dialectic of con-
cept”, “dialectic moment of the position of object”.62 In all these different contexts, the term
dialectics is always linked to the notions of necessity, of radical novelty or unexpectedness, of
movement, progress, or concept.63
So, we can start considering the definition provided by Cavaillès in the article Réflexions
sur le fondement des mathématiques: “Dialectics of the history of mathematics: liberation of
the contingent by mean of the actual, but the actual in its becoming actual is contingent”.64
The importance of the notion of dialectics in Cavaillès consists especially in its dynamical
essence: dialectics is movement. Indeed, being a process, the dialectics unfolds in time, and
so in history and contingency. Notwithstanding this, this movement is not in turn contingent
or arbitrary, because it allows the passage from a moment of becoming to another towards a
sequence that happens necessarily. In fact, the dialectic movement starts from a contingent
moment and, in its development, characterizes it as necessary, since the passage from a
moment to another is pre-determined by the internal needs of the moments itself. To put it
differently, the contingent moment is freed by the actual one because it loses its accidental
nature when it gets tied to the following moment. However, this necessary correlation takes
place in the historical present, and so, in the contingency. For this reason, the dialectic
becoming of the history of mathematics is at the same time necessary and unforeseeable.
4.1 An example of dialectical becoming: thematization
It is possible to find an example of this in the actual mathematical experience and, for in-
stance, in what Cavaillès calls “thematization”. Thematization is, like paradigmatization,
the process which allows to abstract and analyse the forms of demonstrations. In particular,
thematization is a process of abstraction thanks to which an operation becomes in turn the
basis of a superior one. Let us provide an example of how thematization works for Cavaillès.
58(Mougin 1945, p. 75).
59(Cavaillès 1937c, p. 578 and p.580).
60(Cavaillès 1938b, p. 280 and p. 281).
61Cavaillès 1938c, pp. 180, 185, 190, 191).,
62(Cavaillès 1946a, p. 601).
63Cfr. (Sinaceur 1994, p. 116).
64(Cavaillès 1937c, p. 578).
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Geometrical transformations, for instance rotation and translation, are gestures, operations
in a broad sense, that apply to some points in the geometrical space. Thanks to thematization,
the geometrical transformations become a field of objects and undergo a further operation,
that is, composition. Composition provides to the geometrical transformations that Cavaillès
calls “the group structure”, that is, in other words, the composition of geometrical figures.
Composition, thus, is an operation of superior degree than rotation and translation. In fact,
composition is an operation that applies to geometrical transformations, assuming them as
its own object.65 According to Cavaillès, this passage has a dialectical nature:
The development of conscience and the dialectical development of experience coin-
cide, generating the indefinite set of objects in what we call a thematic field. [. . . ]
The necessity of generating an object can only be grasped by the observation of an
outcome; the existence in the thematic field has sense in so far as it is correlated
to a real act.66
The new objects are generated, but the necessary nature of their generation in the thematic
field emerges a posteriori, that is to say, when the movement is done and has determined the
existence of the objects: “At this point, an internal necessity compels the theory to overcome
itself, by means of an unforeseeable development that reveals itself at the end of the pro-
cess”.67 The development of the thematic field, that is, the generation of new objects, takes
place by means of a real act, that is, the act of mathematical experience. This act is perfor-
med by a mathematician in flesh and blood, and the thematization, as a dialectical moment,
occurs in the passage from a theory to another. Indeed, as Cavaillès specifies, it is impossible
to know a priori the results of the necessary process of becoming of mathematics precisely
because finding the solution to a problem is an authentic experience, and the solution itself
assumes all the features of an experience. Being an experience, the search in the mathe-
matical field is “a construction that eventually takes place in the sensible world and thus it
is exposed to the risk of a possible failure, but it is performed according to a rule (that is
to say, reproducible and so a non-event)”.68 To put it differently, all the discoveries in the
mathematical field are possible because the mathematical experience, being an authentic ex-
perience, occurs in the sensible world. There is no abstract thought (or, better, no abstraction
in thought) without a concrete act, there is no necessary becoming without starting from a
contingent experience. As Cavaillès stresses:
There is no really-thought representation (as distinctive of the pure experience)
which, being truly thought – that is to say, organization of the sensible world
according to rules (in virtue of the continuity of mathematical gestures, starting
from the most elementary ones) – is not at the same time a mathematical system.
The existence of objects is correlative to the actualization of a method and, thus,
not categorical, but always depending on the fundamental experience of an actual
thought.69
65Cfr. (Cassou-Noguès 2001, p. 146). Here we can find another example of thematisation, taken from Remarques
sur la théorie abstraite des ensambles. When Cavaillès remarks on Dedekind’s demonstration of an infinite system
existance and when he analises the intuitive numeration, he asserts that thematisation is an operation into a theory,
consisting in making a tought as an object of a thought, i.e. in making a multiplicity as an object similar to an unit.
66(Cavaillès 1938c, p. 185).
67(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 556).
68(Cavaillès 1946a, p. 594).
69(Cavaillès 1946a, pp. 594-595).
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5 Conclusion. “The return to the origin is the return to
the original”
Even the most abstract level, apparently far from the sensible experience, is in fact dialecti-
cally tied to its empirical basis, that is to say, to the moment when the mathematical research
historically began. In this respect, Cavaillès claims this necessity to be a dialectical one, and
not a formal one. In fact, Cavaillès maintains the perception of this necessary order to take
place in the concrete, real, and temporal act, and, at the same time, to be all enlightened by its
own conquest.70 Even at the highest level of abstraction, the sensible basis is not to be neglec-
ted. In this way, it is possible to understand the fundamental role that Cavaillès appoints to
the historical inquiry, which has to reconstruct the connection between the different moments
of the process. As Cavaillès puts it in Sur la logique et la théorie de la science, “the return to
the origin is the return to the original”.71 Looking at the past means giving a reconstruction
of the different moments of the process on the basis of the dialectical moment rather than
of the temporal succession. The return to the origin is not a mere inquiry on the historical
starting point, but consists in grasping the moment when “the broadening of conscience and
the dialectical development coincide”,72 which Cavaillès maintains to be the authentic origin
of the necessary process of becoming. In this sense, “history reveals the authentic meanings,
because allows to find the lost connections, firstly identifying automatisms and sedimenta-
tions, and then vivifying them through an immersion in a conscious actuality”.73 History is
not a mere chronological reconstruction, but rather makes the original moments re-emerge
and gives them a sense because of their re-actualization in the present. In other words, the
original moments are such not merely in a temporal sense, but rather and foremost in an
essential sense. The preceding moments are the necessary basis of the following ones both
from a chronological and a dialectical point of view. The historical reconstruction becomes a
reconstruction of the necessary connections because this necessity itself is not abstract from
the world but rather it is anchored to the sensible universe and to the concrete experience
which takes place in the historical temporality. As Cavaillès writes, “the time has a twofold
necessity: that the immediate act becomes habitude and that the new act loads the system
of the mute trails of the past, making use of them”.74 Time acquires the necessary feature of
the dialectical movement, where present and past are complementary and justify themselves
reciprocally in the unity of movement.
There is no juxtaposition nor a set starting point: it is the entire body of mathe-
matics that develops itself with a single movement, through different stages and
forms – the latter, always as an entire body, achieves or not a certain cognitive
function, through different stages and forms (technical devices included).75
Given this unity of mathematics, a correct historical inquiry should avoid fragmenting or
even describing the becoming as divided into stages, but rather should make the comple-
te dialectical unity of it emerge, and so bring into light the necessary connections and ties
between the past, the preceding acquisitions and their actualization in the present. Mathe-
matics is an authentic historical becoming and so it is irreducible and can be defined only
70Cfr. (Dubarle 1948b, p. 360).
71(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 558).
72(Cavaillès 1938c, p. 185).
73(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 558).
74(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 558).
75(Cavaillès 1947b, p. 556).
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starting from itself: “the mathematical activity is an object of analysis and possess an essen-
ce, but as an odour or a sound, the mathematical activity is itself”.76 Mathematics does have
an autonomous rational legitimacy which is historically connoted, that is to say, that concre-
tely realizes its essence in subsequent stages. Thus, the comprehension of its becoming must
involve a temporal analysis which should be able to connect the past with its actualization in
the present:
Impossibility to characterize the mathematical activity by reducing it to something
else; [mathematics] is not only an intuition, but an original historical becoming.
The starting objects are not whole numbers nor peculiar element of intuition, but
are the result of concrete proceedings meant to organize the action of conscience
in the world. The mathematical data is – in every moment of history – the system
of objects the actual mathematics deals with.77
To conclude, the two essential features of the dialectical movement (necessity and unfore-
seeability) make the mathematical becoming an authentic becoming and characterize the
fundamental dialectics of mathematics. Here, the new notions appear as necessitated by the
given problem and this novelty itself is a real radical one.78
The history of mathematics is not properly a history but a process of re-emersion and
re-actualization of its different moments. It is now possible to understand the apparently
enigmatic statement that Cavaillès wrote in 1938, in its main doctoral thesis, Méthode axio-
matique et formalisme: “There is nothing less historical [. . . ] than the history of mathematics.
But nothing less reducible, in its radical singularity”.79
Ed.: translations by the author.
76(Cavaillès 1949, p. 664).
77(Cavaillès 1937c, p. 578).
78Cfr. (Cavaillès 1946a, p. 601). Cfr. also (Cavaillès 1947a, p.471-472): « The description of these historical
reversals is well known. The result of these revearsals makes emerge the method and the whole system it rised:
from the processes emerging from an internal solution of a problem need to create (in the same actualisation that
gives sense to this need) a big change in the point of view, so that the notions that set up their structure have to
be given up. But the relational links go beyond the empirical history: their dialectical movement assures at the
same time the links’ movement, and, through the links, it assures that the links themselves remain valid. History
is characterized by the submission of the trascendental to its steps: the need of a passage emerges in a failure, the
necessity of the progress emerges in the indetermination of the discovery. Necessity appears when it is all over».
79(Cavaillès 1938c, p. 186).
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